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PRETRIAL DETAINEES HAVE A FOURTH
AMENDMENT RIGHT TO A NONADVERSARY,
JUDICIAL DETERMINATION OF PROBABLE CAUSE
INTRODUCTION
The principle objective of criminal procedure, like that of
procedure generally, is to assure a just disposition of the case.'
This procedural system inevitably represents a series of compro-
mises, because time, resources and the ability to determine what
is just are limited.2 Foremost among procedural compromises is
that which is made when the individual's right to liberty clashes
with the countervailing state interest in combating crime. This
tension is apparent when one contrasts Learned Hand's admon-
ishment that "what we need to fear is the archaic formalism and
the watery sentiment that obstructs, delays and defeats the prose-
cution of crime,"3 with Justice Frankfurter's assertion that "the
history of liberty has largely been the history of observance of
procedural safeguards.1
4
Procedural compromise lies at the heart of the fourth amend-
ment's directive that searches and seizures be reasonable and that
warrants be issued only on probable cause.' The "reasonable" and
"probable cause" standards mandated are in fact the result of
weighing the need for protection of individual rights against so-
ciety's need for law enforcement.' The wrong condemned by the
1. Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in
Criminal Procedure, in A. GOLDSTEIN AND J. GOLDSTEIN, CRIME, LAW, AND
SOCIETY 173 (1971) [hereinafter cited as GOLDSTEIN].
2. Id.
3. United States v. Garsson, 291 F. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923). See Am-
sterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN L. REV. 349, 354
(1974) [hereinafter cited as Amsterdam].
4. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 347 (1943). See Amsterdam,
supra note 3, at 354.
5.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons ... against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause supported by Oath or
affirmation .... "
U.S. CONST., amend. IV. See Berner, Search and Seizure: Status and Method-
ology, 8 VAL. U.L. REv. 471, 505 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Berner].
6. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949). "The sub-
stance of all the definitions of probable cause is a reasonable ground for be-
lief of guilt." Id. at 175. The standard is "less than evidence which would
justify condemnation, Locke v. United States, 2 U.S. (7 Cranch) 560, 569
(1813), and more than 'bare suspicion'." 338 U.S. at 175-76. See note 37 infra
and accompanying text.
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fourth amendment is the unjustified governmental intrusion into
certain areas of an individual's life." In Gerstein v. Pugh,* the
Supreme Court held that the pretrial detention of an accused with-
out a determination of probable cause by a judicial officer is such
an intrusion. The concept of procedural compromise pervades the
Court's holding in Gerstein that a state must provide an accused
with a judicial determination of probable cause as a condition for
any "significant pretrial restraint on liberty."" In accommodating
the compromise between state and individual interests, however,
the Court has softened the impact which Gerstein might have had
in the realm of defendant pretrial rights. This commentary will
examine how the holding in Gerstein reflects, to some extent, the
Court's consideration of individual and state interests, the effect
and shortcomings of the nonadversary determination mandated,
and the way in which states will incorporate the Gerstein direc-
tive into existing pretrial procedure.
THE FACTUAL CONTEXT
In March, 1971, Robert Pugh and Nathaniel Henderson were
arrested in Dade County, Florida. Each defendant was charged
with several offenses under a prosecutor's information, and each
was detained prior to trial.'" At the time of their arrest, Florida
law did not provide for a preliminary hearing where the prose-
cutor had filed an information;" hence, an arrestee could be de-
tained prior to trial solely on the probable cause determination
of the prosecutor.
Requesting declaratory and injunctive relief, 2 Pugh and Hen-
7. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 354 (1974).
8. - U.S. -, 95 S. Ct. 854 (1975).
9. Id. at 868-69.
10. Pugh was denied bail because a robbery charge against him carried
a life sentence; Henderson remained in custody because he was unable to
post a $4,500 bord. Id. at 858.
11. At the time the two were arrested, a Florida rule authorized adversary
preliminary hearings to test probable cause for detention in all cases. FLA. R.
CRIM. P. 1.122 (amended 1972). But the Florida courts had held that the
filing of an information foreclosed the accused's right to a preliminary hearing.
See State ex rel. Hardy v. Blount, 261 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 1972). Florida law
also denied preliminary hearings to persons confined under indictment. See
Sangaree v. Hamlin, 235 So. 2d 729 (Fla. 1970); FLA. R. CrIM. P. 3.131 (a)
(amended 1972).
12. Pugh and Henderson did not ask for release from state custody,
even as an alternative remedy; they asked only that state authorities be
ordered to give them a probable cause hearing. See Pugh v. Rainwater, 332
F. Supp. 1107, 1115-16 (S.D. Fla. 1971). Hence, the lawsuit did not come
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derson filed a class action"3 against Dade County officials in the
federal district court,'4 claiming a constitutional right to a judi-
cial hearing on the issue of probable cause. The district court
agreed that the plaintiffs had such a right under the fourth and
fourteenth amendments and found that they had been deprived
of that right.'" In granting the plaintiffs their requested relief,
the court ordered the defendants to give plaintiffs an imme-
diate preliminary hearing to determine probable cause for fur-
ther confinement.'" The court also ordered the defendants to sub-
within the class of cases for which habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy,
which thus requires exhaustion of state remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1970).
Pugh and Henderson could therefore seek immediate relief in the federal
courts. - U.S. -, 95 S. Ct. at 859 n.6. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
475 (1973).
13. By the time their suit reached the Supreme Court, Pugh and Hender-
son had been convicted. Because the suit was filed as a class action on behalf
of all persons detained pretrial without a neutral probable cause determina-
tion, the claim avoided summary disposition on the basis of mootness:
This case belongs . . . to that narrow class of cases in which the
termination of a class representative's claim does not moot the claims
of the unnamed members of the class. See Sosna v. Iowa, - U.S.
-, 95 S. Ct. 553 (1975). Pretrial detention is by nature temporary,
and it is most unlikely that any given individual could have his
constitutional claim decided on appeal before he is either released
or convicted. The individual nonetheless could suffer repeated de-
privations, and it is certain that other persons similarly situated will
be detained under the allegedly unconstitutional procedures. The
claim, in short, is one that is distinctly capable of repetition, yet
evading review.
U.S. -, 95 S. Ct. at 861 n.11.
14. The federal court obtained jurisdiction of the case and was em-
powered to give relief through exceptions to the principle regarding federal-
state comity in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). The claim in Gerstein
was not directed at the state prosecutions per se, but only at the legality of
pretrial detention without a judicial hearing, an issue which could not be
raised in defense of the criminal prosecution. "The order to hold preliminary
hearings could not prejudice the conduct of trial on the merits." - U.S.
-, 95 S. Ct. at 860 n.9. Thus, the interference which the Court in Younger
feared, was absent, and concepts of federalism did not dictate absention.
15.
A criminal system wherein the individual faces prolonged im-
prisonment upon the sole authority of the police or prosecutor violates
the principles which underly this country's founding and which are
the essence of the constitutional guarantees of freedom . . . from
deprivation of liberty without due process of law .... A preliminary
hearing in direct information cases is compelled by the Fourth
Amendment as well as by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Pugh v. Rainwater, 332 F. Supp. 1107, 1113-14 (S.D. Fla. 1971).
16. Id.
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mit a plan providing preliminary hearings in all cases initiated
by information."
The district court's mandate provoked a flurry of planning
activity in Florida. The court first adopted a plan submitted by
Dade County Sheriff E. Wilson Purdy (the Purdy Plan) which
required that persons arrested with or without warrants in Dade
County be afforded expeditious preliminary hearings before a
magistrate; those not provided such hearings were to be released
immediately." Implementation of the Purdy Plan was stayed by
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals during the pendency of the
appeal, at which time Dade County's judiciary voluntarily moved
to establish its own plan for providing preliminary hearings.
About the same time, the Florida Supreme Court amended
the rules regarding preliminary hearings statewide.'" While the
amended rules provided for a first appearance hearing, they did
not require a determination of probable cause. The rules also
changed the procedure for preliminary hearings by restricting
them to felony charges and denying them to defendants charged
by information or indictment.2
On remand to the district court, the parties stipulated that
the court should consider the amended state rules rather than
the Dade County procedures.2 ' In a supplemental opinion, the
court declared that the continuation of the practice of detaining a
suspect charged by information without a judicial determination
of probable cause was unconstitutional.2 The Fifth Circuit af-
firmed in part and suggested further that the form of preliminary
hearing dictated by the amended Florida rules would be accept-
able as long as the hearing were afforded to all defendants in
custody.23
The United States Supreme Court affirmed on the right of
an incarcerated defendant to a probable cause hearing but re-
versed on the requirement that it be an adversary hearing. The
Court, per Mr. Justice Powell, held that the fourth amendment re-
quires a judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite
17. Id.
18. 336 F. Supp. 490, 491 (S.D. Fla. 1972).
19. 355 F. Supp. 1286, 1287-88 (S.D. Fla. 1973).
20. Id. at 1289. The rules now conformed to the accepted Florida prac-
tice. See note 11 supra.
21. 355 F. Supp. at 1288. See also Pugh v. Rainwater, 483 F.2d 778,
788-90 (5th Cir. 1973) (amended rules and Purdy Plan examined).
22. 355 F. Supp. at 1289.
23. 483 F.2d at 790.
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to extended restraint of liberty following arrest.2" A prosecutor's
decision to file an information, based on probable cause, is in-
sufficient to justify detaining a suspect prior to trial, since the
prosecutor is too closely affiliated with law enforcement authori-
ties; the determination must be made by a "neutral and detached"
magistrate or other judicial officer.2 The Court disagreed, how-
ever, with the Fifth Circuit's finding that the determination must
be made in an adversary proceeding and held that the nature of
the hearing justified an informal procedure.2 In a concurring
opinion, per Mr. Justice Stewart, four Justices confirmed the ma-
jority's holding that Florida's pretrial detention procedure was
inadequate and that the Constitution requires "a timely judicial
determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to pretrial de-
tention.' ' 27 The Justices objected, however, to the majority's rul-
ing that the hearing need not be adversary in nature and con-
tended that the due process clause of the fifth amendment re-
quires an adversary hearing.2 8
BALANCING INTERESTS IN GERSTEIN
State and Individual Interests in Arrest
In Gerstein, the Court displayed respect for the delicate com-
promise between the state's interest in law enforcement and the
individual's right to be secure in his person, interests which nec-
essarily clash on occasion of arrest. In Terry v. Ohio, " the Court
stated:
An arrest . . . is intended to vindicate society's in-
terest in having its laws obeyed and it is inevitably ac-
companied by future interference with the individual's
freedom of movement, whether or not trial or conviction
ultimately follows."0
The interference occasioned by arrest, besides restricting free-
dom of movement, impinges on the arrestee's personal dignity,
reputation, and his right to be free from arbitrary actions by
the state." On the cognitive map of the average citizen, the no-
24. - U.S. - , 95 S. Ct. 854, 863 (1975).
25. Id.
26. Id. at 866.
27. Id. at 869-70.
28. Id.
29. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
80. Id. at 26.
31. See generally L. KATZ, JusTIcE Is THE CRIME: PRETRIAL DELAY IN
FELONY CASES 51-62 (1972) [hereinafter cited as KATZ].
203
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tion "arrest" is far too easily associated with the concept of guilt.
On the other hand, the state has the right to demand that its
laws be obeyed. The duty to control criminal activity belongs to
the state. Community needs dictate that the state remove an in-
dividual, as soon as possible, if he represents a threat to the com-
munity's physical security.2 The state's interest in an arrest,
then, lies in initiating criminal proceedings against an offender
of its laws and in removing him from society.
The Standard for Arrest
To accommodate both state and individual interests, arrest is
based on a probable cause standard. In effect a standard of rea-
sonableness," the probable cause measure represents a "necessary
accommodation between the individual's right to liberty and the
State's duty to control crime."" Citing language from Brinegar v.
United States," the Court in Gerstein noted that the probable
cause standard is a,
practical, non-technical conception affording the best
compromise that has been found for accommodating
these often opposing interests. Requiring more would
unduly hamper law enforcement. To allow less would be
to leave law abiding citizens at the mercy of the offi-
cer's whim or caprice. 6
In promoting individual liberty, the probable cause formula
deprives police of the use of mass arrest tactics and arrests on
suspicion, on open charges, and for questioning. The Court has
traditionally held that common rumor or report, suspicion, or
even "strong reason to suspect" are not sufficient for an arrest.'
Depriving an individual of his liberty is mandated only when
there exists probable cause to believe that a crime has been com-
mitted and that the accused committed it.3
32. Id. at 52.
33. Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 317-20 (1959).
34. - U.S. - , 95 S. Ct. at 862.
35. 338 U.S. 160 (1949).
36. - U.S. - , 95 S. Ct. at 862, quoting Brinegar v. United States,
338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949).
37. Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 101 (1959). See also Giordenello
v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 487 (1958); Hogan and Snee, The McNabb-
Mallory Rule: Its Rise, Rationale, and Rescue, 47 GEo. L.J. 1, 22 (1958)
("Arrest on mere suspicion collides violently with the basic human right of
liberty"). For a discussion of the standard of arrest in early American de-
cisions before and after the adoption of the fourth amendment, see Henry,
supra at 101-02; Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 317-20 (1959).
38. See Berner, supra note 5, at 493-94.
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But the probable cause standard also takes into account the
state's need for effective law enforcement. In Locke v. United
States,3" Chief Justice Marshall wrote that "probable cause means
less than evidence which would justify condemnation [that is,
conviction].""' Evidence required to establish guilt is not neces-
sary for arrest ;4' the standard is not one of reasonable doubt:
In dealing with probable cause, as the name implies,
we deal with probabilities. These are not technical; they
are the factual and practical considerations of everyday
life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal tech-
nicians, act.42
Individual and State Interest in Detention
The personal losses resulting from an individual's arrest may
be compounded by his subsequent detention. Incarcerated persons
are deprived of "personal freedom in the most immediate and lit-
eral sense of those words."" Necessarily at stake is the person's
"right to be let alone," which Justice Brandeis once termed "the
most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civi-
lized men.""
The loss of liberty in the detention of an individual may have
disastrous effects. Pretrial confinement disrupts employment and
education and may weaken or destroy family relationships." In-
evitably the accused is exposed to oppressive and degrading living
89. 2 U.S. (7 Cranch) 560 (1813).
40. Id. at 569.
41. Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 102 (1959).
42. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 174-75 (1949). See generally
Berner, supra note 5, at 493-505.
43. United States v. Thompson, 452 F.2d 1333, 1340 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
44. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting). Other rights which are placed in jeopardy when an individual
is detained may include: the fundamental rights to privacy, Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973); and to travel, Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa
County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974); the freedom to walk about, Papachristou v.
City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972) ; the freedom to associate freely
with persons of one's own choice, Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51 (1973);
and the right to choose and maintain one's family relationships, Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651-52 (1972); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12
(1972). See also Note, Bail and Its Discrimination Against the Poor: A
Civil Rights Action As a Vehicle of Reform, 9 VAL. U.L. REV. 167, 184-85
(1974) [hereinafter cited as Bail].
45. See Wald, Pretrial Detention and Ultimate Freedom: A Statistical
Study; Foreword, 39 N.Y.U.L. REV. 631, 632 (1964) [hereinafter cited as
Wald]; Bail, supra note 44, at 184-85; Note, An Answer to the Problem of
Bail: A Proposal in Need of Empirical Confirmation, 9 COLUM. J.L. & Soc.
PoB. 394, 396 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Answer].
205
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conditions; the quality of life in most "holding" jails is recog-
nized as abject." Incarceration may further create resentment,
bitterness, apathy, and anxiety in the accused."'
Most significantly, perhaps, detention may impede prepara-
tion of the detainee's defense48 or even jeopardize his right to any
trial at all."9 Furthermore, empirical studies have concluded that
46. KATZ, supra note 31, at 56-57; See also Answer, supra note 45, at
396-98; Note, Constitutional Limitations on the Condition of Pretrial Deten-
tion, 79 YALE L.J. 941, 942 (1970). A holding jail is a county or municipal
institution whose inmates are serving minor sentences or awaiting disposition
of their cases.
47. Wald, supra note 45, at 632.
48. The problems of trial preparation that accompany pretrial incar-
ceration are myriad. "Detention drastically limits the accused person's ability
to marshall evidence, locate witnesses, and consult with counsel." Smith v.
Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 379-80 (1969); Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 8 (1951)
(Jackson, J., concurring). The task of locating witnesses often falls on the
defendant's attorney; when the lawyer is white and his client is black and a
ghetto resident, further problems are created.
Tracking down ordinary defense witnesses in the slums to support
the defendant's alibi or to act as character witnesses often has a
Runyanesque aspect to it. The defendant in jail tells his counsel
he has known the witnesses for years but only by the name of "Tooth-
pick," "Malachi Joe," and "Jet." He does not know where they live
or if they have a phone, he is sure he could find them at the old
haunts, but his descriptive faculties leave something to be desired.
Since a subpoena cannot be issued for "Toothpick," of no known
address, counsel sets off on a painstaking, often frustrating, search
of the defendant's neighborhood. He stops children at play; he at-
tempts door-to-door conversations with hostile and suspicious slum
dwellers.
P. Wald, Poverty and Criminal Justice in THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON
LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT:
THE COURTS (app. C) 139, 145 (1967). Even if the witnesses are found, the
attorney must induce them to appear at trial without the help of the accused.
Other inconveniences burden the defendant's attorney. He must schedule
consultation with his client around jail visitation hours, and he is unable to
make needed spot calls to the defendant to check details. Bail, supra note 44,
at 179-80. These and other inconveniences can be considered prejudicial to
the defendant's case. See also Answer, supra note 45, at 400.
49.
In light of the personal losses caused by removal from society, the
uncertain and often long and brutal pretrial detention period, and the
defendant's doubts of acquittal, plea bargaining becomes a defendant's
most realistic course. Despite actual innocence, he confesses in order
to begin serving a known, relatively light sentence in a more humane
prison facility . . . it has been found that where the court calls are
backlogged and the period of pretrial detention long, the percentage
of guilty pleas increases . . . thus, pretrial detention can improperly
influence the defendant to plead guilty.
Answer, supra note 45, at 398-430.
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a greater percentage of detained defendants are subsequently con-
victed than are defendants who are released pending trial ;5" and,
it has been shown that detainees are customarily handed harsher
sentences.' Thus, pretrial detention can have an effect on the
disposition of the defendant's case.
The state's interest in pretrial detention is roughly the same
as that in arrest;52 the urgency to sustain the interest, however,
lessens. The criminal process has begun, and with the alleged
offender behind bars, the need for immediate further action dis-
sipates. Because of this discrepancy between individual and state
interests at the time of detention, closer scrutiny of the decision
to incarcerate is required.
What Is Required for Detention
The fourth amendment prevents unlawful detention as well
as unlawful apprehension. To this end, the standard needed to
detain is held to be the same as that needed to arrest-probable
cause. 3 In the case of arrest, police are empowered to act on
their own probable cause beliefs." Gerstein, however, holds that
more is required for the lengthy detention of an arrestee. Con-
sider the following hypotheticals:
50. A New York study, completed in 1964, showed that fifty-seven per-
cent of those released prior to trial were not convicted, while only twenty-
seven percent of those detained were not convicted. Independent factors such
as prior convictions and type of counsel were held constant throughout
the study. Ranking, The Effect of Pretrial Detention, 39 N.Y.U.L. REy. 641,
642-43, 655 (1964). See also Answer, supra note 45, at 401-03, wherein a
similar study conducted in 1971 by the New York Legal Aid Society is dis-
cussed.
51. Wald, supra note 45, at 635; Answer, supra note 45, at 403.
52. It may be added that the state has a further interest in pretrial
detention: to insure the appearance of the defendant at trial. This interest
has also been considered the purpose of bail. Answer, supra note 45, at 898.
The issue of bail is closely intertwined with the problem of pretrial
detention. In evaluating Gerstein, it may be assumed that the defendant
has also been considered the purpose of bail. Answer, supra note 45, at 898.
ditions for that release. But the Court implied in Gerstein that where a
defendant is subjected to overly restrictive conditions for his release, he
is entitled to a Gerstein hearing, despite the fact that he is not incarcerated.
The Gerstein directive is required for all defendants who suffer restraints on
liberty "other than the condition that they appear for trial . . . the key
factor is significant restraint on liberty." - U.S. -, 95 S. Ct. at 869 n.26.
53. Id. at 866.
54. Id. at 862-63; Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96 (1964) (There is a prefer-
ence, however, for the use of arrest warrants when feasible.)
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(1) Police officers have probable cause to believe
that suspect X committed a crime. The police,
armed with the facts and circumstances support-
ing their belief, seek out a judicial officer and ob-
tain an arrest warrant. The police seize X and in-
carcerate him pending further proceedings. The
prosecutor files an information against X. X re-
mains in jail.
(2) Police officers have probable cause to believe
that suspect Y committed a crime. The police
weigh the facts and circumstances of their belief,
seek out Y, and incarcerate her. Shortly there-
after the police confront the prosecutor with the
facts and evidence, and he in good faith files an
information against Y. Y languishes in jail.
Maximum protection of an individual's rights to liberty and
to be free from unfounded charges might be assured by requir-
ing judicial scrutiny of the factual justification prior to every
arrest55 - that is, the procurement of an arrest warrant, as in situ-
ations analogous to (1). A person arrested under a warrant re-
ceives a judicial determination of probable cause prior to his ar-
rest, and because the standards for arrest and detention are iden-
tical, probable cause for the suspect's subsequent confinement has
been found. Hence, Gerstein does not apply where the suspect is
arrested and detained on a warrant. 6 The requirement of a war-
rant in every case of arrest, however, would unduly burden law
enforcement. There necessarily are times when police officers
cannot wait for the issuance of a warrant; circumstances may
justify the immediate apprehension of a suspect."'
Gerstein concerns itself with situations analogous to (2),
where the suspect is arrested and detained on the probable cause
belief of the police and prosecutor. In an arrest situation, the
compromise between state and individual interests justifies a
police officer assessing probable cause for himself in order to
arrest and to detain the individual briefly to take the administra-
tive steps incident to the arrest." Once the individual is com-
mitted to custody, however, the reasons that justified the police-
man's assessment of probable cause diminish:
55. - U.S. - , 95 S. Ct. at 862.
56. Id. at 864 n.18.
57. Such circumstances include: the suspected immediate flight of the
accused, or the police officer's presence at the crime.
58. - U.S. - , 95 S. Ct. at 863.
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Once the suspect. is in custody... there no longer is any
danger that the suspect will escape or commit further
crimes while the police submit their evidence to a magis-
trate. And, while the State's reasons for taking sum-
mary action subside, the suspect's need for a neutral de-
termination of probable cause increases significantly. The
consequences of prolonged detention may be more serious
than the interference occasioned by arrest. Pretrial con-
finement may imperil the suspect's job, interrupt his
source of income, and impair his family relationships....
When the stakes are this high, the detached judgment of
a neutral magistrate is essential if the Fourth Amend-
ment is to furnish meaningful protection from unfounded
interference with liberty. 9
Thus, Gerstein requires a judicial determination of probable
cause, either before or promptly after arrest, to safeguard an in-
dividual's right to liberty when that right is jeopardized by de-
tention. Two recent cases6 ° have stressed the proposition that
judicial detachment in a probable cause determination is man-
dated by the fourth amendment."1 In Johnson v. United States,"
59. Id.
60. Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345 (1972), and Coolidge v.
New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971), both held that judicial detachment
is constitutionally mandated in the areas of arrest and search. In Coolidge,
the State of New Hampshire argued that its Attorney General, who was
authorized to issue warrants under state law, did in fact act as a neutral
judicial officer. The Court responded: "[P]olice and prosecutors simply
cannot be asked to maintain the requisite neutrality with regard to their
own investigations - the competitive enterprise that must rightly engage
their single minded attention." 403 U.S. at 450. The holding of Coolidge was
reaffirmed in Shadwick, where the City of Tampa authorized the issuance
of arrest warrants by clerks of the municipal court. Petitioner Shadwick
challenged a warrant on the basis that the clerks were not neutral and
detached magistrates for purposes of the fourth amendment. The Court
held that the Constitution mandates that arrest warrants be issued only
by judicial officers or magistrates, and that the clerks were judicial officers.
If there is sufficient detachment from law enforcement authorities and capa-
bility to determine whether probable cause exists, then the judicial officer
has satisfied the fourth amendment's purpose. 407 U.S. at 350.
61. Professor Berner in his article offered the rationale underlying
this requirement:
Since such person [a magistrate] is not involved in the "competitive
enterprise of ferreting out crime," his judgment, presumably, will be
made strictly on facts and legitimate inferences untainted by emo-
tion, hunch, or the compulsion of his job. There is no reason to
think a police officer is less aware of individual rights or the under-
lying rationales for those rights than most others, and much to sug-
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the Court expressed the view that judicial scrutiny is an integral
part of the fourth amendment:
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which is not
grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies law en-
forcement the support of the usual inferences which rea-
sonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists
in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral
and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the
officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of
ferreting out crime.'
The key to the Gerstein decision is prolonged detention and
its serious consequences; when an individual faces lengthy pre-
trial detention, judicial scrutiny of probable cause is required to
give individual rights some degree of protection against opposing
state interests as mandated by the fourth amendment. 64
THE GERSTEIN DIRECTIVE
In Gerstein, the Court recognized that a suspect's detention
following his warrantless arrest requires a greater, judicial scru-
tiny than that required for the arrest itself. The hazards of
prolonged pretrial confinement, the Court noted, may be more
gest he is more aware than many. Yet the nature of his charge
offers both the opportunity and, often, the seeming necessity for the
compromise of such rights.
Berner, supra note 5, at 505.
62. 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
63. Id. at 14. Justice Frankfurter also spoke of the need for separat-
ing the functions of law enforcement and judicial officers. In McNabb v.
United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943), he stated:
[S]afeguards must be provided against the dangers of the over-
zealous as well as the despotic. The awful instruments of the crim-
inal law cannot be entrusted to a single functionary. The compli-
cated process of criminal justice is therefore divided into different
parts, responsibility for which is separately vested in the various
participants upon whom the criminal law relies for its vindication.
Id. at 343.
64. The Court in Gerstein noted, however, that it was not overruling
its prior decisions holding that a judicial hearing is not a prerequisite to a
prosecution by information. Beck v. Washington, 369 U.S. 541, 545 (1962);
Lem Woon v. Oregon, 229 U.S. 586 (1913). In addition, the Court stated
that it did not intend to retreat from its established rule that an illegal
arrest or detention would not void a subsequent conviction. Frisbie v. Col-
lins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952); Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886. - U.S. -,
95 S. Ct. at 865.
65. - U.S. - , 95 S. Ct. at 863.
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serious than the interference occasioned by arrest."" Yet the Court
also held that the standards for detention and arrest are identi-
cal, and that the procedure involved in determining whether there
is probable cause to detain resembles that followed to obtain an
arrest warrant.' As such, Gerstein merely requires that the
prosecutor procure an arrest warrant after the defendant's arrest
The probable cause hearing therefore becomes susceptible to the
rubber-stamping habits of hurried magistrates or those who tend
to be influenced by prosecutors."8 While the same argument has
been used to criticize the warrant-issuing process before arrest,"
the possibility exists that the practice might become even more
prevalent once the magistrate is aware that the suspect is in
custody.
Because the loss occasioned by pretrial detention is greater
than the interference caused by arrest, the question arises whether
the Court went far enough in its attempt to protect individuals
from unfounded loss of liberty. The Court's distinction between
arrest and detention, and the significantly greater interest in-
volved in the latter, suggests that a standard more stringent than
probable cause be required to test the validity of confinement,
or that the hearing be held in an adversary proceeding.
Imposing a Higher Standard to Test the Validity of Pretrial In-
ccrceration
If a standard higher than probable cause (for example, an
evidentiary standard tending to establish guilt or preponderance
of the evidence) were required to justify a suspect's pretrial
detention, more investigation by police following a probable cause
arrest would be necessary before the validity of the incarceration
could be tested."0 Although a higher standard would better protect
66. Id.
67. Id. at 866.
68. See Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 111 (1964), wherein the Court
asserted that the magistrate must perform his "neutral and detached" func-
tion and not serve merely as a rubber stamp for police.
69. See, e.g., L. ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FROM ARREST To APPEAL
75 (1947) ; Berner, supra note 5, at 505-06; GOLDSTEIN, supra note 1, at 186;
Comment, Constitutional Requirements for the Authority to Issue Warrants,
1972 WASH. U.L.Q. 777, 781 (1972).
70. Because the standards for arrest and detention are the same, there
should be no need for further investigation before the probable cause de-
termination can be made. See Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 456
(1957). If further investigation is needed after arrest, the police have
arrested without the requisite probable cause and the suspect must be re-
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the defendant from the. many losses accompanying pretrial con-
finement, it would also diminish the possibility that the hearing
could be held promptly after arrest. As well as handicapping
police, who would have to obtain more evidence to detain criminals
than to arrest them, a higher standard would also act to incar-
cerate innocent as well as guilty for a significantly longer period,
since it is doubtful that police investigations could be concluded
within 48 hours or so after arrest. Hence, while more suspects
might be discharged if a higher standard of proof were utilized,
more would also remain in jail for a longer period of time to
compensate for the more detailed investigation required. Further,
a marked inequality of standards would result for those arrested
on warrants vis-i-vis warrantless arrestees: suspects arrested on
warrants could be detained on the probable cause necessary for
the warrant, while warrantless arrestees would have the benefit
of the higher standard.
Requiring an Adversary Hearing
The Court reversed the holdings of both the district court
and the Fifth Circuit which held that an accused must be afforded
an adversary hearing to determine probable cause." The single
issue of probable cause for detention, the Court believed, could
be determined fairly and reliably without an adversary hearing. 2
Because of the hearing's limited function, it was held not to be a
"critical stage" in the prosecution that would require the presence
of counsel."'
The Court further justified its nonadversary holding on the
basis that the nature of the determination and its resulting con-
leased. If it is doubtful whether probable cause exists, the investigation
must precede the arrest; anything less infringes on the fourth amendment
directive.
71. - U.S. - , 95 S. Ct. at 866. See Pugh v. Rainwater, 336 F.
Supp. 490 (S.D. Fla. 1972), and the Fifth Circuit's opinion at 483 F.2d 778
(5th Cir. 1973). What the lower courts had in mind was a full preliminary
hearing where the accused has the right to counsel and the right to con-
front and cross-examine witnesses for the state. It is significant to note
that the issue in the instant case concerns the validity of pretrial incarcera-
tion without a judicial determination of probable cause, not, strictly speak-
ing, the unconditional right to a preliminary hearing.
72. - U.S. -, 95 S. Ct. at 866.
73. Id. at 867. A "critical stage" is a pretrial procedure that would
impair defense on the merits if the accused is required to proceed with-
out counsel. Id. See Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970); United
States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967). While the hearing to test pretrial
detention would not directly impair defense on the merits, it may have
that effect indirectly. See notes 48-51 supra and accompanying text.
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sequences render an adversary proceeding unnecessary. Probable
.cause,
does not require the fine resolution of conflicting evidence
that a reasonable doubt or even preponderance standard
demands, and credibility determinations are seldom
crucial in deciding whether the evidence supports a
reasonable belief in guilt."
A finding that there is probable cause sufficient to support the
apprehension of the accused will result in his further confine-
ment. These consequences were considered by the Court to be
"lesser" than those stemming from the ultimate disposition of
the suspect's case, where the outcome may be conviction."5 As
such, adversary features were not deemed required at the hearing. 6
Maximum protection of a detainee's rights might conceivably
be better protected if he were provided a full adversarial hearing;
the presence of defense counsel, at least, could insure that the
decision to further confine the defendant was not arbitrary or
made on suspicion. There is a strong argument, raised in Mr.
Justice Stewart's concurring opinion, that such a hearing is
mandated by the due process clause of the fifth amendment and
applicable in the criminal as well as the civil realm."" The argu-
74. The Court acknowledged, however, that rights to confrontation
and cross-examination at the hearing may "enhance the reliability of the
probable cause determination in some cases." - U.S. -, 95 S. Ct. at
867. But the value of these adversary features,
would be too slight to justify holding, as a matter of constitutional
principle, that these formalities and safeguards designed for trial
must also be employed in making the Fourth Amendment determina-
tion of probable cause.
Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 866-67.
77. Both the district court and the Fifth Circuit held that the plaintiffs
had a due process right to a preliminary hearing to test probable cause for
detention. Pugh v. Rainwater, 332 F. Supp. 1107, 1113-14 (S.D. Fla. 1971);
483 F.2d 778, 786-87 (5th Cir. 1973). Justice Stewart in his concurring
opinion carried further the reasoning of the lower courts on the due process
right to a hearing:
Specifically, I see no need in this case for the Court to say
that the Constitution extends less procedural protection to an impris-
oned human being than is required to test the propriety of garnishee-
ing a commercial bank account, North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v.
DiChem, Inc., - U.S. - , 95 S. Ct. 719 (1975); the custody of
a refrigerator, Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974),
the temporary suspension of a public school student, Goss v. Lopez,
- U.S. - , 95 S. Ct. 729 (1975), or the suspension of a driver's
213
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ment was summarily rebutted in a footnote to the majority opinion
on the grounds that the fourth amendment "always has been
thought to define the 'process that is due' for seizures of person
or property in criminal cases . .,,"8
Instead of avoiding the due process/adversary hearing issue,
the Court might have replied that such a holding would render
it impossible to schedule the hearing promptly after arrest. Counsel
would have to be appointed or retained, and witnesses would have
to be summoned in the effort to determine whether probable cause
existed for the defendant's further confinement. It has been held
that procedural due process requires the opportunity to be heard ;",
but an adversary hearing mandate would make a prompt post-
arrest determination of probable cause impossible, thereby detain-
ing a suspect for a longer period of time and contributing to
general pretrial delay.
Incorporating Gerstein into Existing State Pretrial Procedure
The Supreme Court in Gerstein set no definitive time limit
within which a suspect must be provided a hearing."° Clearly,
however, Gerstein evidences the need for the earliest possible
license, Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971). . . . I cannot join the
Court's effort to foreclose any claim that the traditional require-
ments of constitutional due process are applicable in the context of
pretrial detention.
- U.S. - , 95 S. Ct. at 869-70. A test for providing procedural due
process was offered in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970):
The extent to which procedural due process must be afforded the re-
cipient is influenced by the extent to which he may be "condemned
to suffer grievous loss," Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee V.
McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring), and
depends upon whether the recipient's interest in avoiding that loss
outweights the governmental interest in summary adjudication.
397 U.S. at 262-63.
78. Justice Powell defended the fourth amendment rationale of Gerstein
by asserting that the fourth amendment guaranteed the threshold right
to a probable cause determination, and that this determination was only
the first stage of the elaborate criminal justice system. "The relatively
simple civil procedures . . . [cited in Justice Stewart's concurring opinion]
are inapposite and irrelevant in the wholly different context of the criminal
justice system." - U.S. -, 95 S. Ct. at 869 n.27.
79. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965); Grannis v. Ordean,
234 U.S. 385 (1914).
80. The Court did, however, speak of a "brief period of detention,"
- U.S. -, 95 S. Ct. at 863, and ultimately held that "the determination
must be made either before or promptly after arrests." Id. at 869. (empha-
sis added).
It may be suggested that the absence of a definitive time limit allows
for differences in the pretrial procedures of states. For example, Montana
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 10, No. 1 [1975], Art. 7
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol10/iss1/7
1976] DETERMINATION OF PROBABLE CAUSE 215
determination of probable cause in warrantless arrest cases, and
the Court's sanctioning of the informal procedure enables state
court systems to make the determination soon after the accused
is taken into custody. In examining existing state pretrial pro-
cedure with a view toward incorporating the Gerstein directive,
one finds that the hearing is easily accommodated by the "initial
appearance" procedures of every state.' Indeed, it appears as
if the Court decided Gerstein with the intent of disrupting as
little as possible current state pretrial practices, despite dicta
recognizing "the desirability of flexibility and experimentation
by the States"82 in adopting the Gerstein hearing.
State "initial appearance" or presentment statutes usually
require the defendant to be brought before a magistrate or other
judicial officer following arrest."3 When the defendant is pre-
sented, the magistrate informs him of the charge against him
and advises him of his constitutional rights and right to a pre-
liminary hearing, if mandated.' Some states dictate that the
preliminary hearing be held at this stage if feasible.85 The magis-
trate may also admit the suspect to bail and appoint counsel if
he is found to be indigent. 6
As noted by the Court, some states already provide for a
probable cause examination at the presentment;"? Gerstein re-
requires the defendant to be brought before a magistrate after arrest "with-
out unnecessary delay." MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 95-901 (1947). While
in New Hampshire, the accused must be brought before a magistrate within
24 hours of his arrest. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 594.20-a (Supp. 1970).
81. See, e.g., ARIz. R. CRIM. P. 4.1-.2 (1974); CAL. PENAL CODE § 858
(West 1970); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 39-2-3, 39-2-20 (Supp. 1965); ILL
ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 109-1 (Smith-Hurd 1970); IND. CODE §§ 35-1-8-1, 35-3.1-
1-1 (1975); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 276, §§ 22, 34 (1968); MICH. COMp. LAWS
ANN. § 764.26 (1968); N.Y. CRIM. PRO. LAW § 120.90, 140.20 (McKinney
1971); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. arts. 14.06, 15.17 (1966).
82. - U.S. - , 95 S. Ct. at 868.
83. See, e.g., ARIz. R. CRIM. P. 4.1-.2 (1973); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 39-2-3, 39-2-20 (Supp. 1965); T/iASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 276, §§ 22, 34 (1968).
For a general discussion of the initial appearance procedure, see Y. KAMISAR,
W. LAFAVE AND J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 8-9 (4th ed. 1974)
[hereinafter cited as MOD. CRIM. PRO.].
84. MOD. CRIM. PRO., supra note 83, at 8-9.
85. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 109-1 (Smith-Hurd 1970).
86. MOD. CRIM. PRO., supra note 83, at 8.
87. - U.S. -, 95 S. Ct. at 861 n.24. Such states are Colorado,
Hawaii, Indiana and Vermont. A typical statute or rule provides:
If the defendant was arrested without a warrant . . . and the
prosecution is upon information, the judicial officer shall determine
in the manner provided . . .whether there is probable cause to be-
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quires that other states adopt this practice. For these states, it
would require little change in their initial appearance procedures
to implement the Gerstein hearing; the burden on prosecutors
and courts is no greater. The danger exists that the hearing
will become as routine and methodical as other aspects of the
presentment, thus rendering the Gerstein directive meaningless.
But imposing defense counsel and other adversary features upon
the hearing would defeat the expediency of the procedure, evi-
dently the primary consideration in the Gerstein decision.
CONCLUSION
With a flourish the Supreme Court announced in Gerstein
that suspects arrested without warrants and subsequently de-
tained are constitutionally entitled to a prompt judicial deter-
mination of probable cause for that detention. In its struggle to
maintain a balance between individual and state interests, the
Court has merely sanctioned a procedure by which an arrest
warrant, after the fact of arrest, is obtained. Ideally, such a
procedure should have the effect of screening the innocent from
unfounded charges and prolonged detention, while detaining only
those against whom probable cause has been found; practically
speaking, however, it remains to be seen whether the holding will
provide an accused with an effective and meaningful right.
Because the standard for detention is the same as that for
arrest, the Gerstein directive places no greater burden upon police
and prosecutorial staffs.8 And, while the accused is now afforded
a probable cause hearing promptly after arrest, he nevertheless
is denied an adversary proceeding which might more effectively
ascertain the truth in a questionable arrest or detention situation.
Further, states have relatively little adjustment to make in their
pretrial procedures to implement the Gerstein requirement; Ger-
stein fits almost too comfortably into present state presentment
vehicles. In view of these factors, Gerstein may be regarded as
a narrow triumph for individual rights in the continuing conflict
between individual and state interests in the realm of criminal
procedure, perhaps a surer triumph for states.
lieve that an offense has been committed and that the accused
committed it.
VT. R. CRIM. P. 5(c) (1974). See also COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§39-2-3,
39-2-20 (Supp. 1965) (applies to warrant arrests as well); HAwAII REv.
STAT. § 708-9 (1968) (defendant must be brought before magistrate for exam-
ination within 48 hours of arrest); IND. CODE §§ 35-1-8-1, 35-3.1-1-1(d)
(1975).
88. See note 70 supra.
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